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By Dave Hoffman

Lawyers in Westeros

This is Part 2 of the interview I did with George R. R. Martin in  2007.  For background and part 1, click here.  For the audio file, click here.

 HOFFMAN: Are there lawyers in your books that are just in the wings off stage that haven’t yet appeared?

MARTIN: That’s an interesting question. I hadn’t really considered that until I started reading those links that you sent me. There are certainly laws but are there special classes of advocates who make their living by interpreting those laws? My inclination is probably not because the laws my books are administered by lords. In some ways it’s government as much for men than law. We like to say our government in the United States is a government of laws not men. In some ways the Seven Kingdoms I think is the reverse. There is basis of a law but also a lot depends on who is interpreting it and who is sitting in the Lord’s seat, who is sitting on the Iron Throne and how they settle these disputes.

HOFFMAN: Well those are ultimate questions but I think in two places one could have imagine lawyers and one of them again will be this church trial because there were church lawyers in the ecclesiastical church system there were lawyers who specialized in canon law. And the second one was at least twice I can think of in the books there’re trials by combat. And I don’t really know what the other alternative would be but I assume would be trial by jury – the path that Tyrion did not choose both times. And I was thinking –

MARTIN: Well he does choose in the first…in the second…second of his two trials, he is being tried – it’s not by jury – it’s by lord. There’s no jury of his peers, no twelve people that are randomly picked but there are three lords sitting on his case and hearing the evidence.

HOFFMAN: Right.

MARTIN: And, you know, the –

HOFFMAN: Tyrell I think is one of them, I don’t remember the other two.

MARTIN: Oberyn Martell, who is the Red Viper is one of them, in order to balance it because they want a semblance of impartiality. It’s a hopeless thing because his father is the presiding judge and the right hand of the king and his sister, who is also the daughter of the same father, is the chief complainant who is accusing him of doing these things. But that does have semblance of a trial where witnesses are being called forth, people are swearing oaths, people are testifying against him and saying what they saw and what they did not saw. Though Tyrion realizes that it’s hopeless, he’s losing that so he exercises an option as a lord to request a trial by combat instead.

HOFFMAN: Which was a bad choice –

MARTIN: When Oberyn stands for him he thinks he has a better chance there. And he has gotten off...

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The Law of the Game of Thrones

In 2007, I did an interview with GRRM as a part of CoOp’s then vibrant “Law and Hard Fantasy” series.  (Yes, I know I’ve let it drop for half-a-decade, but new interviews are now coming out.)

Given the new-found fame of the Game of Thrones, I decided to have the interview transcribed for those of you who don’t want to listen.  Thanks to Temple’s Danielle Pinol who did the work.  I’m going to provide the transcript in three parts.  Here’s part I, about the roots of sovereign power in Westeros.  Part II talks about lawyers and magic. Part III will talk about fantasy literature more generally.

 

DAVID HOFFMAN: Today’s edition of Law Talk is unique in two respects: first I’m obviously not Nate Oman your usual host, I’m instead Dave Hoffman a law professor at the Temple University’s Beasley School of Law and with Nate, a blogger with Concurring Opinions. Today’s guest is distinct as well. George R.R. Martin is not a law professor, but instead a best-selling author of fantasy books including the renowned multi-volume work, “A Song of Ice and Fire.” The most recent book in that series, “A Feast for Crows,” was a New York Times #1 best seller. Martin is currently hard at work on the series’ next book, “A Dance for Dragons.” George joined me today to talk about the relationship of fantasy to law, a topic I recently blogged about several times. Along the way, we also talked about the laws of inheritance, copyright, and fan fiction; how to keep control over your work when it is filmed; remedies for breach of contract of sale in a magical world; and why most fantasy books seem to be set in England around the year 1400. I hope you enjoy it.  Ok well let’s get started, in some interviews you’ve suggested or other people have suggested that your books are fantasy for folks that don’t like fantasy. What does that mean?

GEORGE R.R. MARTIN: Well, that’s a marketing slogan but there’s a certain element of truth to that. I do get a numbers of fans who write me and say they enjoy my books but they’re not normally fantasy readers. One of the things I attempted to do when I started a Song of Ice and Fire these many years ago was to give as much of a flavor of historical fiction as of fantasy. And I think to the extent I’ve succeeded in that the books are attracting some people who prefer historical fiction to fantasy for whatever reason. I also wanted to make it a little grittier and more realistic than a lot of the fantasy that was out there at the time.

HOFFMAN: It seems like in order to make that happen, you do an immense amount of historical research and the way I think you’ve described it is you create a couple of bookshelves of information, you try to soak it all up and instead of working it in like a –

...

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Interesting example of prosecutorial discretion

The Philadelphia Inquirer has been fed the goods on a very interesting tale of prosecutorial discretion:

“The Pennsylvania Attorney General’s Office ran an undercover sting operation over three years that captured leading Philadelphia Democrats, including four members of the city’s state House delegation, on tape accepting money, The Inquirer has learned.

Yet no one was charged with a crime.

Prosecutors began the sting in 2010 when Republican Tom Corbett was attorney general. After Democrat Kathleen G. Kane took office in 2013, she shut it down.

In a statement to The Inquirer on Friday, Kane called the investigation poorly conceived, badly managed, and tainted by racism, saying it had targeted African Americans.”

There’s obviously much more here than meets the eye, including a fight between Kane and Frank Fina, who had led the state’s investigation into the Sandusky mess, and a further fight between Kane and much of Pennsylvania’s governing class.  But the details are sordid:

Before Kane ended the investigation, sources familiar with the inquiry said, prosecutors amassed 400 hours of audio and videotape that documented at least four city Democrats taking payments in cash or money orders, and in one case a $2,000 Tiffany bracelet.

Typically, the payments made at any one time were relatively modest – ranging from $500 to $2,000 – but most of those involved accepted multiple payments, people familiar with the investigation said. In some cases, the payments were offered in exchange for votes or contracts, they said.

Sources with knowledge of the sting said the investigation made financial pitches to both Republicans and Democrats, but only Democrats accepted the payments.

In explaining the decision to close the sting investigation without filing charges, Kane said one reason was that prosecutors in the case had issued orders to target “only members of the General Assembly’s Black Caucus” and to ignore “potentially illegal acts by white members of the General Assembly.”

The Inky’s reporting on this case is incredibly deep, even though it seems evidently based in leaks by someone who hates the Attorney General and wants everyone to know it.  Certainly worth reading.

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Why the Mirror Image Rule Still Matters

This story, which took the academic world by storm, demonstrates the continued vitality of the mirror image rule:

“[A philosophy tenure track job] candidate . . . sent the following email to search committee members at Nazareth College, in Rochester, N.Y., after receiving a tenure-track job offer in philosophy:

“As you know, I am very enthusiastic about the possibility of coming to Nazareth. Granting some of the following provisions would make my decision easier[:]

1) An increase of my starting salary to $65,000, which is more in line with what assistant professors in philosophy have been getting in the last few years.

2) An official semester of maternity leave.

3) A pre-tenure sabbatical at some point during the bottom half of my tenure clock.

4) No more than three new class preps per year for the first three years.

5) A start date of academic year 2015 so I can complete my postdoc.”

She ended the email by saying “I know that some of these might be easier to grant than others. Let me know what you think.”

In a reply, the search committee said it had reviewed the requests, as had the dean and vice president of academic affairs.

“It was determined that on the whole these provisions indicate an interest in teaching at a research university and not at a college, like ours, that is both teaching and student centered,” the email continues. “Thus, the institution has decided to withdraw its offer of employment to you.”

The search committee ended by thanking the candidate for her “interest” and wishing her “the best in finding a suitable position.”

As many have pointed out, an employment lawyer might be able to make some hay if emails within the department discussed #2 in any detail. (Which they likely did, since academics have no email discipline.)

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Intuitions About Contract Formation

Tess Wilkinson-Ryan and I have a new paper up on SSRN, titled Intuitions About Contract Formation.  In the great Redyip tradition, I thought I’d blog about it. From the abstract:

Legally, much depends on the moment that a negotiation becomes a deal.  Unlike torts or civil procedure or any area of public law, the laws of  promissory exchange only apply to parties who have manifested their assent to be bound. Even so, the moral norms of exchange and promise are quite firmly  entrenched and more broadly applicable than just legal contracts. Norms of promise-keeping and reciprocity, interpersonal courtesy, community reputation—these kinds of intangible goods have real effects on contract behavior. For this reason it is especially surprising that intuitions about formation have gotten so little attention from legal and behavioral scholars. This paper offers five new empirical studies of commonsense approaches to contract formation. The first section of this Article surveys intuitions about what the law of formation is. In a world in which the vast majority of contracts are signed without the advice of counsel, most people have to draw inferences based on their background knowledge and beliefs. It turns out that the colloquial understanding of contract formation is about the formalization of an agreement rather than actual assent.

In the second part of the Article, we tease out the intuitive relationship between formation and obligation. The law of contracts is very clear that  parties’ obligations to one another turn entirely on whether or not they have mutually manifested assent to be bound. And, in fact, we find that behavioral results suggest that legal (or legalistic) formation does enhance commitment to a deal irrespective of its power to impose sanctions; it seems that the law has freestanding normative force. However, we also find that the subjective sense of obligation is not as black or white as the law would predict. Parties are influenced by the natural, informal obligations to one another that build over the course of a transaction, increasing their commitment to the partnership in stages rather than all at once at the moment of formation.

To set the paper up a bit, Tess and I had previously found that when subjects are told they are in legally binding contracts, they lower their guard against exploitation & treat contracting parties like partners.  This raised a question that Intuitions tries to answer:  what are subjects’ naive views about formation?  We show that they differ systematically from the operative doctrinal rules, which creates a window for exploitation — when consumers believe themselves to be in contracts but aren’t. For example, individuals think that payment is contract, not agreement.  In one experiment, for example, we asked:

“Peter is ordering new custom speakers from Audionuts, a mail-order sound system retailer. Peter calls the company and speaks at length to a customer service representative, hashing out the details of his order, which include speakers for his main media unit (TV and stereo system) as well as his portable devices (phone and iPad). Peter and the customer service representative...

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