Temple Law Logo TU Portal

Topics

Latest News

By Dave Hoffman

Article Stub: Finding Offerors under 2-207

[I'm planning to write a series of posts I'll call article stubs - the germs of papers I'll likely never write. Dan Markel might - or more likely might not - approve. I used to talk about these pre-draft ideas with him, and he mercifully steered me off most of them before they saw the light of day. In his honor, here's a bad idea. Feel free to tell me so.]

 

UCC 2-207, the battle-of-the-forms provision, is famously a mess.  White and Summers describe it as “an amphibious tank that was originally designed to fight in swamps, but was sent to fight in the desert.” That’d be even more accurate if you replaced “tank” with “Ford Pinto.”  Complexities about.  (Check out this fabulous flowchart produced by one of my students, which provides one path through the maze.) But even if you work  your way through the various intricacies of the provision, resolving debates about the meaning of “expressly made conditional,” and the “knock-out rule,” a deep policy problem lurks: who, exactly, is the offeror?

The question is important because, although the provision was designed to account for a flurry of forms, it clearly privileges those forms which come first-in-time, typically finding the first mover to be an offeror. Unfortunately for the second mover (which can be a nano-second slower online) the merchant offeree’s additional terms are incorporated into the contract only if they are immaterial. Most terms that you’d care to litigate about are material. Summers and White point out that avoiding first form favoritism is an important policy goal, but proceed by privileging that first form as the offer anyway.  (See the 4th edition of their Hornbook, p. 32, n.3)  We can see the importance of the choice clearly by pairing Hill (offeror is the firm) with Klocek (offeror is the consumer). But the cases stand uneasily against each other, because the key analytic move (who goes first and why) is buried — to be fair, less so in Klocek than in Hill. (I’m sweeping broadly here, and avoiding knock-out complications.)

At some level, this confusion is unavoidable – 2-207 is a badly drafted mess.  But in particular here, the problem is that although important consequences flow from making one or the other party the offeror, the Code provides no guidance in making that choice – it doesn’t even use the word offeror in the section.  Doctrine would be marginally  more clear if we made the decision as to who is the offeror explicitly a policy choice. Courts might, for example, make sellers offerors because they bear default liability burdens (warranty, nondelivery) under the UCC. Or courts could empower buyers because they typically initiate transactions, thereby spurring commerce.  Or make the choice depend on some kind of rough information-forcing default allocation.  The key realization is that 2-207 buries the lede, and that courts which simply follow the provision leave us in the dark.

Via Concurring Opinions

View Story

Posted Under :

Evolving Contract Schemas

With co-authors, I’ve been working on a series of experimental papers about contract law that appear to be converging on a theme: what individuals think “contract” means has purchase in the real-world, and that contractual schema is evolving.

A schema is nothing more than a mental model – a framework – to help us organize and process information. A contract schema is the set of background assumptions that we fill in when we think about a legally operative bargain. For those of us who grew up in a largely off-line world, our contract schema involve “doing the paperwork,” “getting it in writing,” and “signing on the dotted line.” (See this article for details). Indeed although most contracts law professors make fun of the metaphor of meeting of the minds, it captures a real heuristic for a certain segment of society. That so even though form contracts have been part of modern life since the 50s, and almost none of of ever actually negotiate contracts that could end up in court. Indeed, when I started teaching in 2004, students routinely would say “she signed it, she must be bound to it,” even in cases like Specht.  Since this mental model is quite a ways from the reality of online contract, consumers may think they are in contracts when they aren’t, and visa versa.

But what happens when contracts widely explored in pop culture – and presented to you in your formative years – were never signed, never reduced to writing, never negotiated.  The cheerios arbitration debacle, facebook’s demystified terms, your cellphone contract, your cable company’s impossible-to-escape relationship.  What happens when every time you think “contract,” you don’t call up the mental image of a “signature on vellum” but instead “loki on steroids.”  And when companies, realizing this, increasingly pushed “no contract” plans that were actually contracts, just without penalty clauses attached.

Perhaps citizens born after 1980 will have dramatically different attitudes toward contract than those born before. If that’s true, we’ll increasingly find cohort effects in contracting behavior online, as lay intuitions about how to respond to “contract” increasingly turn on the age of the promisee. For those coming of age offline, “click to agree” calls up memories of signature, and consequently infuses bargains with personal honor; for those born digital, “click to agree” means “nothing good is about to happen to me.” Those attitudes toward contract will play out in behavior – in likelihood to breach, to shirk, and to behave opportunistically.

At some point we expect to have direct evidence worth sharing in support of this argument! For now, I thought start discussion by fast forwarding fifteen years, when many judges born in the digital age will have assumed the bench. What changes in contract doctrine follow from changes in contract’s schema? Then again, will there be any contract cases left to decide, or will they all been sucked into arbitration’s black hole?

 

Via Concurring Opinions

View Story

Posted Under :

Dan Markel, My Friend

Dan Markel had many friends.  You, the reader, know that if you have been surfing any of the law professor blogosphere, which is full of tributes, notes of gratitude and sadness, and a residue of shock and disbelief.  Indeed, Dan Markel knew more legal academics - by which I mean he had more meaningful conversations and was actually friends with more people - than anyone in the country. Everyone knew him or had a story about him. Even in conversations he wasn’t a part of, at conferences he’d never attended, he was a common point of reference. He was our Kevin Bacon.

I’ve been friends with Dan since law school. He gave me comments on my first paper.  They were tough (“why are you writing a 25 page literature review that no one, including you, will care to read”) but right. And he gave me tough comments on my second paper. Again, he was right.  And my third paper. And my fourth. He didn’t stop when it become obvious that he was also giving hours of time weekly to literally dozens of other people’s work, when he was blessed with two young sons, when he built an active intellectual life at FSU, when he undertook a brutal travel schedule. He gave of himself despite writing scores of articles (and books and op-eds and drafts and more articles) of his own. His unselfishness and rigor were daunting. Where did he find the time? The energy?

But I couldn’t help but keep asking for his help, because no one gave comments like Dan Markel. He wanted to get your arguments right – and he wanted you to write the best version of yourself possible. On the Prawfs thread, I laughed to read a comment that someone can’t help but remember him asking if she had written a “puzzle paper or a problem paper.” Take heart! He thought the third option was not worth your effort. Dan never let you be lazy, and he was a celebrant when you hit a home run. Or even a double. And getting comments from Dan meant giving comments to Dan, which usually involved reading long articles with surprising payoffs, or getting an email and reading just a few pages where Dan had cited your work and wanted to be sure he’d done it justice. Dan attacked his own work like he worked on yours — unsentimentally, methodically, tirelessly, approaching greatness.

Dan reached out constantly.  As I wrote on twitter (which he hated and which he told me I was wasting my time on), in the 17th century, he’d have been Pepys.  In the 19th century, he’d have been a famous letter writer (and romantic poet!)  In the 20th century, he’d have spent most of his income on long-distance phone calls. As it was, I -and many others-got regular calls from him, resulting in a conversation on one of his long walks, or on the way to pick up his boys from day care, or just on a drive.  In each of those conversations he was open & seemingly without that part...

Via Concurring Opinions

View Story

Posted Under :

Introducing Guest Blogger Brishen Rogers

I’m delighted to welcome Brishen Rogers (Temple) as a guest blogger for the next month.  Brishen teaches torts, employment discrimination, and a seminar on current issues in labor law. Prior to joining the Temple faculty, Professor Rogers was a Climenko Fellow and Lecturer on Law at Harvard Law School.

Professor Rogers’ scholarship draws on the social sciences and liberal political theory to better understand the role of law in constituting and regulating paid work relationships, with a particular focus on issues of concern to low-wage workers.  One current project explores the role of law and social norms in shaping workers’ preferences towards unionization; another explores the proper role for minimum workplace entitlements in an egalitarian liberal state.  His work has been published in the Harvard Law Review Forum, and the Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor Law, among others.

Professor Rogers received his J.D., cum laude, from Harvard Law School and his B.A., with high distinction from the University of Virginia.  Prior to law school, he worked as a community organizer promoting living wage policies and affordable housing, and spent several years organizing workers as part of SEIU’s “Justice for Janitors” campaign.  Welcome Brishen!

Via Concurring Opinions

View Story

Posted Under :

Judge, Jury, and Arbitrator: The NBA Constitution

The NBA has finally made its constitution available online. Notwithstanding the grand title, the document styles itself as a mere contract: “This Constitution and By-Laws constitutes a contract among the Members of the Association . . . The Association and each of its Members shall be subject to the oversight and control of the Board of Governors of the Association as set forth herein and shall be governed by the Constitution and By-Laws, rules, regulations, resolutions, and agreements of the Association, as they may be modified or amended from time to time.”

The justification for Commissioner Silver’s actions turns on this document. Article 24 vests in the Commissioner the power to suspend members, though Don Sterling is permitted an evidentiary contest (which didn’t make the news today):

“Following an opportunity for the affected party to submit evidence and be heard, all actions duly taken by the Commissioner pursuant to this Article 24 or pursuant to any other 39 Article or Section of the Constitution and By-Laws, which are not specifically referable to the Board of Governors, shall be final, binding and conclusive, as an award in arbitration, and enforceable in a court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the laws of the State of New York. In connection with all actions, hearings, or investigations taken or conducted by the Commissioner pursuant to this Article 24, (i) strict rules of evidence shall not apply, and all relevant and material evidence submitted may be received and considered, and (ii) the Commissioner shall have the right to require testimony and the production of documents and other evidence from any Member, Owner, or Referee, any employee of any Member or Owner, and/or any employee of the Association, and any person or Entity not complying with the requirements of the Commissioner shall be subject to such penalty as the Commissioner may assess.”

Article 13(a) then permits the Commissioner to force a sale:

“The Membership of a Member or the interest of any Owner may be terminated by a vote of three fourths (3/4) of the Board of Governors if the Member or Owner shall do or suffer any of the following: (a) Willfully violate any of the provisions of the Constitution and By-Laws, resolutions, or agreements of the Association. [If 13(a) is triggered, the league will conduct an evidentiary hearing, at which] the Member or Owner so charged  shall have the right to be represented by counsel. Strict rules of evidence shall not apply, and all relevant and material evidence submitted prior to and at the hearing may be received and considered . . . The affirmative vote of three-fourths (3/4) of all the Governors shall be required to sustain the charges.”

Importantly, “The decisions of the Association made in accordance with the foregoing procedure shall be final, binding, and conclusive, and each Member and Owner waives any and all recourse to any court of law to review any such decision.”

Professor Michael McCann has argued that this last “waiver of recourse”...

Via Concurring Opinions

View Story

Posted Under :